This paper investigates whether the size of multinationals' real investments in a high-tax country is affected by profi t-shifting activities. Tax rates in locations other than the host country impact the cost of capital for multinational companies that shift profi ts. As profi t-shifting opportunities constitute a competitive advantage, the respective size of investments should theoretically increase if profi ts can be shifted to a lower-taxing country. An empirical analysis based on a panel of German inbound investments confi rms a positive tax response of real investments with an increasing tax rate differential between the host country and the foreign direct investor's home country. Hence, the results suggest that the size of foreign investments in a high-tax country is positively affected by a lower taxation of shifted profi ts.
INTRODUCTION
C orporate tax rates vary signifi cantly between different countries. Real investment decisions are affected by these international differences in business taxation. Moreover, cross-country profi t shifting of multinationals can be observed. Governments attempt to restrict profi t-shifting opportunities in order to protect their tax revenues. Then, from a theoretical point of view, consequences for the level of investment in high-taxing countries can be expected, which may also intensify tax competition (see, e.g., Keen, 2001; Peralta, Wauthy and van Ypersele, 2006) . This paper aims to provide empirical insight into the interaction between profit-shifting activities and real-investment decisions. Particular attention is paid to the issue of whether the size of multinationals' real investments in high-tax locations is affected by the taxation of shifted profi ts.
Previous empirical literature confi rms that corporate taxation signifi cantly affects business decisions. In particular, the effects of corporate taxation on multinationals' foreign direct investment decisions have been extensively analyzed. This literature confi rms signifi cant negative effects of the host country's tax level on the size and the frequency of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 1 Furthermore, there is striking evidence that the cross-border shifting of paper profi ts is associated with international tax rate differentials. 2 Several studies, such as Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) , show that fi nancial structures are used to shift profi ts. Moreover, there is evidence that multinationals' transfer pricing is also tax driven (Clausing, 2003 (Clausing, , 2006 Grubert, 2003) . The success of such shifting strategies is confirmed by studies that fi nd that the reported profi tability of multinationals' affi liates is negatively affected by the level of the local tax rate (see, e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) .
Only very few studies have analyzed both profit-shifting and investment effects. Hines and Rice (1994) , Grubert and Slemrod (1998) as well as Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) provide evidence that US investments at typical tax havens are associated with profi t shifting. However, empirical studies dealing with the expected corresponding investment effects in high-tax countries are still rare. Grubert (2003) fi nds that US multinationals whose profi t shifting opportunities are higher than average choose locations with either extremely low or extremely high tax levels. The preference for tax havens stems from the need for locations that serve as tax shelters. By contrast, the higher attractiveness of high-tax locations for multinationals can be explained by competitive advantages due to profi t-shifting opportunities.
The following study contributes to the understanding of the effects of profi t shifting activities on multinationals' investment decisions in high-tax countries. The analysis focuses on effects of profi t shifting on investment levels rather than on location decisions. Using data of German multinationals, Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2008) confi rm that negative investment effects arise if profi t shifting is restricted by thin-capitalization rules. Becker and Riedel (2008) analyze several channels through which the tax rate of the parent company's location may affect the affi liate's investment level. In accordance with a profi t-shifting effect, they fi nd a positive impact of the tax rate differential between the host country and the parent company's home country on investment levels of affi liates located in several European high-and low-tax countries. Unlike these studies, our analysis is exclusively based on investment data of foreign-controlled affi liates located in one specifi c high-tax country: Germany. Since Germany has an extremely high tax rate, the focus of this analysis lies on the positive investment effects that can arise from a lower taxation of shifted profi ts. Furthermore, we consider affi liate-specifi c asymmetries in profi t-shifting incentives in our analysis of investment effects.
A tax rate of a location other than the host country affects the cost of capital if profi ts are effectively shifted toward that location. Let us, for example, consider a parent company located in Ireland and a subsidiary located in the host country Germany. Without profi t-shifting activities, the investment level of the subsidiary is only infl uenced by the German tax rate. However, a part of the profi ts of the German affi liate may be shifted to the parent company in Ireland, since the Irish tax rate is signifi cantly below the German tax level. The shifted profi t amount is effectively taxed in Ireland. Then, the Irish tax rate has an impact on the cost of capital of the subsidiary in the host country Germany. The gains from profi t shifting increase with a rising tax rate differential, in this case between Germany and Ireland. This example suggests that the investment size of a subsidiary in a high-tax country should theoretically increase with a rising tax rate differential if profi ts are shifted.
2 Detailed surveys concerning empirical evidence on several aspects of companies' international tax planning behavior are provided by Hines (1999) and Devereux (2007) .
The empirical analysis is based on the MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment) database, a comprehensive micro-level panel database of virtually all FDI projects in Germany, made available by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) for research purposes. Germany as a host country of FDI is a matter of particular interest for several reasons. First of all, the German statutory company tax rate is almost the highest in the world. Hence, there are high incentives to shift profi ts out of Germany. 3 Secondly, Germany is the biggest economy in Europe and an important location for FDI, e.g., of US fi rms. Finally, due to European directives, profit shifting toward other European countries is not restricted by withholding taxes. The specifi c advantage for the empirical analysis lies in the very high German tax level. If parts of the profi ts of affi liates located in Germany are shifted toward their parent companies, one can expect a positive impact of a higher tax rate differential between the host country Germany and the parent company's home country on the investment level of the affi liate in Germany. Our empirical analysis reveals that the investment levels of subsidiaries in high-tax Germany are positively affected by a rising tax rate differential between Germany and the direct owner's home country. Hence, the results suggest that investments in a high-tax country are signifi cantly affected by competitive advantages due to a lower taxation of shifted profi ts.
The analysis is structured as follows. In the next section, a theoretical model examines profi t shifting and investment decisions of a multinational corporation. The third section empirically analyzes the implication that-due to profi t shifting activities-the investment levels of subsidiaries in a high-tax host country are responsive to tax rate differentials between the host and the direct owner's home country. The fi nal section concludes.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A Model of Profi t Shifting and Investment
The impact of profi t shifting activities on real investment decisions of a multinational company can be described via a simple company model with only two locations. The parent company is denoted by 1, and the controlled affi liate, by 2. The affi liate's profi t is basically determined by output f 2 (k 2 ), whereas k 2 is the amount of capital invested at the foreign location. Typical characteristics of a production function are assumed as f 2,k (k 2 ) > 0; f 2,kk (k 2 ) < 0. Moreover, opportunity costs of capital, denoted by r, are considered. Furthermore, the company can shift an amount of the affiliate's profit to the parent company's location. In practice, a multinational has several opportunities to effect this shift, for example, by means of interest payments for internal loans or tax-optimal transfer prices for intra-fi rm sales. It is reasonable to assume that the amount of shifted profi ts is related to the size of the affiliate's business activity, i.e., to the amount of invested capital. This shifting amount per capital unit is denoted by λ 2 . 4 The tax rate t 2 of the host country is avoided by means of profi tshifting activities. Correspondingly, the shifted amount is taxed by the tax rate of the other location, in this case by the tax rate t 1 of the parent company. 5 Hence, the 3 A recent analysis by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) on the tax impact on profi t allocation within European multinationals suggests that Germany in particular loses tax revenues due to cross-border profi t-shifting activities in Europe. 4 A commonly applied channel, for example, is internal debt shifting. In this case, λ represents the share of intra-company debt to assets multiplied with the interest rate paid for the internal credit. 5 Withholding taxes on shifted profi ts are neglected. For example, the withholding taxes on interest payments are typically low and can be credited against the lender's corporate tax. However, in the case of German data, which is used in the empirical analysis, no withholding taxes are imposed on interest payments. expression (t 2 -t 1 )λ 2 k 2 refl ects the impact of profi t shifting on the profi t after taxes. In addition, it is reasonable to consider some costs that depend on the level of intra-fi rm profi t shifting. The costs for inter-company loans, for instance, might arise from tax as well as non-tax constraints, such as costs arising from asymmetric information and agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) . With regard to tax-optimal transfer pricing of intra-fi rm deliveries, it is reasonable to assume that the tax advisory costs and the likelihood of audit and penalties rise with an increasing deviation from the arm's length price. Hence, a convex cost function c 2 (λ 2 ) is assumed. 6 Furthermore, there are several non-tax reasons to carry out transactions that effectively shift profi ts between affi liates. For example, inter-company debt is used for short-term cash management between parent and affi liate or as an instrument to control the local management through fi xed annual interest payments. Therefore, a concave function g 2 (λ 2 ) is assumed, refl ecting the non-tax gains from profi t shifting. 7 Then, the affiliate's profit π 2 after taxes and profi t shifting activities can be described as
where the expression in squared brackets refl ects the impact of profi t shifting. The model assumes that investments of the affi liate 2 are not directly related to investments of the parent company. Moreover, it is assumed that inter-company dividends are tax exempt. In this case, the tax level of the affi liate is fi nal. This holds true for investors from most European countries and Canada. By contrast, in the case of a tax system based on a worldwide tax base like the US system, the foreign profi ts are taxed by t 1 at the parent's location when they are repatriated. Foreign taxes can be credited against these tax payments. However, a credit system effectively becomes an exemption system if the foreign tax level is higher than the tax level at home. 8 The following empirical analysis will be exclusively based on foreign affiliates in the high-tax host country Germany. During the considered period the combined tax level consisting of the German company tax and additional withholding taxes on profi t distribution was higher than the tax level at home if the parent company resided in a home country with a worldwide tax system. 9 Therefore, the dividends were tax exempt at home even if the parent company's home country applies a worldwide tax system. Equation [1] reveals that intra-firm profi t shifting between the affi liate 2 and the parent company 1 affects after-tax profits. Hence, the profit amount per invested capital that is shifted internally λ 2 and the amount of capital k 2 invested at the host country should both be responsive to the tax rate differential (t 2 -t 1 ). In order to choose the optimal amount for internal shifting, the following fi rst-order condition is obtained:
When taking into account the convex character of the cost function, the amount of taxable profi ts, which is shifted internally, increases with a rising tax rate differential. Comparative statics, shown in the appendix, point out that the optimal shifting amount increases with a rising host country tax rate t 2 and decreases with an increasing tax rate t 1 of the direct owner, toward which the profi t is shifted.
Regarding the optimal amount of capital invested by the affi liate 2, we additionally obtain
.
The expression on the right hand side of equation [3] can be interpreted as the cost of capital, i.e., as a required rate of return. A company invests until the marginal capital productivity f 2,k (k 2 ) matches this required rate of return. Consequently, a higher host country tax rate t 2 in the denominator leads to higher cost of capital, i.e., the investment size is negatively affected.
The expression in squared brackets of equation [3] refl ects the profi t-shifting effect on the cost of capital. Taking into account equation [2] , the cost of capital decreases if a company shifts taxable profits and the firm's management is able to optimize the cross-country profi t allocation. Comparative statics in the appendix highlight the fact that profi t shifting reduces the effect of an increasing host country tax rate t 2 . Correspondingly, the cost of capital becomes responsive to the tax rate t 1 of the parent location if profi ts are shifted to the parent company. Thus, the optimal investment level decreases with a rising tax rate t 1 . This means that, unlike cases without profi t shifting, another tax rate, e.g., of the parent company, determines the investment level in a high-tax host country. Taken together, due to profi t shifting the cost of capital decreases with a rising tax rate differential (t 2 -t 1 ). This effect is intensifi ed by an increasing incentive to shift higher amounts of profi ts with a rising tax rate differential. Thus, we can expect that a rising tax rate differential between the host country and the parent company's home country has a positive effect on the investment level of a subsidiary located in a high-tax host country. We will test this proposition in the empirical part of this paper.
Losses
The incentive to shift profi ts changes if the current profi t is negative or if former losses are carried forward. In this case, the immediate advantage of shifting profi ts into another affi liate is mitigated. In the context of the model presented above, the value of avoided taxes decreases signifi cantly and tends to become zero if loss compensation cannot be expected in the future. However, empirical identifi cation is limited since one cannot measure profitability before profi t shifting in practice. Nevertheless, a loss carryforward seems to be a suitable indicator for affi liates that have a signifi cantly smaller incentive to shift profi ts. 10 In this case the current profi t for tax purposes becomes zero irrespective of any profi t-shifting activities. Thus, as a result the sensitivity of investment levels concerning tax rates of other locations decreases if an affi liate has a loss carryforward. 11 Therefore, affi liates in a high-tax country that also have a loss carryforward may constitute a suitable control group for an empirical test on a tax effect that arises from profi t shifting.
Interposed Entities
The model has considered a very simple company structure. In practice, company group structures are more complex. This also holds true for the data used by the following empirical analysis. Table 1 considers German inbound investments, which are ultimately held by US parent companies in 2005. Table 1 denotes that, in 2005 for example, only 62.5 percent of US controlled affi liates in Germany are directly held by US companies. Approximately 14 percent are indirectly held via interposed companies, which are located in the Netherlands. Moreover, Luxembourg and Switzerland are important locations for interposed entities although they are comparably small countries, whereas the United Kingdom and France are big European economies that also have significant numbers of conduit entities. If fractions, which are weighted by investment stocks in fi xed assets, are considered, only 44 percent of US controlled FDI in Germany are held directly by US companies.
A number of possible management reasons might render it necessary to organize business activities in functional divisions or regional structures. Furthermore, tax reasons are important determinants of group structures and chains of ownership. Firstly, withholding taxes on repatriated profi ts can be reduced if an entity located in a country offering favorable tax treaties is interposed between parent company and affi liate. This so-called treaty-shopping strategy might explain the existence of some of the conduit companies in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. 12 Secondly, interposed entities can be used to defer taxation of repatriated foreign income if the parent company's country taxes corporations on a world-wide tax base. 13 However, irrespective of any other reasons for setting up interposed entities, they can serve as a shelter for profi t shifting activities. Consequently, shifted profits are taxed at the tax rate of the interposed entity in place of the parent company's tax rate. 14 Intercompany payments such as royalties and interest are deducted at the level of an affi liate located in a high-tax country and taxed at the interposed entity in a low-tax country. Financial structures using a conduit entity can be used to achieve a double dip of interest deductions for the parent company and the investment affi liate (Mintz, 2004) . In this case, a parent company borrows capital and injects equity capital into an interposed entity located in a low-tax country. The interposed entity lends this capital to a high-taxed affi liate. Interest is deducted twice at the level of the high-tax subsidiary and at the level of the ultimate parent company, while inter-company interest income is taxed at the conduit entity. Total tax payments are reduced if the tax rate of the interposed entity is comparatively low. Altshuler and Grubert (2006) provide evidence for several profit-shifting strategies of US multinationals that use a subsidiary in a low-tax country. Since 1997, a US parent company can identify an affi liate as an unincorporated branch of another affi liate. As a result, US multinationals can avoid the US tax under the current CFC rules on inter-company payments because these payments are invisible to the U.S. Treasury. However, from the point of view of the other fi scal authorities, the affi liates are two separate corporations and inter-company payments are deductible at the level of the high-tax subsidiary. The proposition that conduit entities are set up as profi t-shifting shelters is indirectly confi rmed by previous empirical work, which has found an increasing business activity in tax havens (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006) . Given that the advantage of profi t shifting is not restricted to affi liates in typical tax havens, the following analysis considers interposed entities in 40 countries, mostly located in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and EU (European Union) countries.
Opportunities to take advantage of a lower tax level by shifting profi ts may not be restricted to the parent company or conduit entities. Nevertheless, they seem to be of special relevance when considering the number of fi nancial and business transactions between directly affi liated companies. The empirical analysis will mainly be focused on the tax differential between the host country Germany and the country of the direct owner of the subsidiary because information about the group structure is limited in the data set.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Considering the vast amount of empirical evidence on profi t-shifting activities of multinationals, the empirical analysis focuses on the investment effects related to these profit-shifting activities. The theoretical discussion suggests that if profi ts are shifted, tax rates at locations other than the host country have an effect 13 The relevance of this strategy to avoid or defer repatriation taxes is empirically confi rmed by Altshuler and Grubert (2003) as well as by Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) . 14 This argument resembles that of Altshuler and Grubert (2003) , who fi nd that US multinationals use foreign companies at low-tax locations in order to retain foreign profi ts, which are taxed at a level below the US tax rate. By means of this strategy, the higher US taxation can be deferred. Whereas a strategy to avoid repatriation taxes might be of little importance considering the comparably high tax level in Germany, conduit entities can be used to shift profi ts from a high-tax country such as Germany into a lower taxed conduit entity. Consequently, the high German tax level is avoided and the US tax level is at least deferred.
on investment decisions. The following empirical analysis aims at identifying this expected positive effect of an increasing tax rate differential between the host country and the direct owner's home country on the investment levels of subsidiaries in one specifi c high-taxing host country, Germany.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals, provided by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). This is a comprehensive annual micro database of direct investment positions of German enterprises held abroad as well as of direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies. However, this analysis is only based on the data of German inbound FDI positions. The data provides annual information on the investment object's balance sheet, including further information on the type of investment and on the foreign investor. 15 The collection of the data is enforced by the German law, which implements reporting obligations for certain international transactions and positions. 16 This last aspect of MiDi is worth emphasizing: the database contains virtually every German inbound investment. Access to this data is permitted provided that no confi dential single data is published. A favorable characteristic of this data set is the possibility of tracing direct investment positions of individual fi rms over time. Due to the panel data structure, it is possible to control for heterogeneity across companies. The version used provides fi rm-level panel data for the period of 1996 to 2005. Table 2 shows the fractions of the different home countries of German inbound FDI. Only those subsidiaries that are incorporated and directly controlled by foreign investors holding more than 50 percent of the shares are taken into account. Subsidiaries are not considered if they are indirectly controlled via another subsidiary located in Germany. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to subsidiaries whose ultimate parent company is located in a member state of the OECD or the European Union. Important home countries of ultimate owners are Germany's neighboring countries such as France, the Netherlands, Austria, or Switzerland. Furthermore, a high number of investments are held by companies from big economies such as Japan, Canada and, of course, the US. During the period of 1996 until 2005, more than 20 percent of the considered foreign affi liates in Germany were affi liates of US companies. Due to interposed companies, the distribution of the direct owners' locations varies. Table 2 reveals that the Netherlands and Switzerland are more important as a location for direct owners. Correspondingly, the shares of direct owners, for example, from Japan or the United States are small in comparison to the respective shares of ultimate owners from these countries.
The balance sheet item "fi xed assets" of each affi liate refl ects the real investment level. This variable is employed as the dependent variable. Therefore, the empirical analysis is only based on subsidiaries that display positive real investment levels in fi xed assets for every reported year. Furthermore, companies from the fi nancial sector are excluded. A dummy variable LCF is used as a fi rm-15 See Lipponer (2006) for a detailed description of the data set. 16 Sec. 26 Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection with Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Every German affi liate held by a foreign multinational has to report its assets conditional on certain threshold levels. Since 2002, inbound FDI has to be reported if the balance sheet total of the investment object surpasses three million Euros. For details, see Lipponer (2006) . Despite lower threshold levels in previous years, this higher threshold level is uniformly applied for all years in the panel.
level explanation variable. This dummy takes on the value one if a subsidiary has a loss carryforward at the beginning of the fi nancial year. Otherwise, the dummy is zero. Therefore, the dummy refl ects the possibility to set off current earnings with losses carried forward. As for the tax variables, the variable STR contains the statutory tax rate of the direct owner's home country. In additional regressions, the variable STR ult , which is the statutory tax rate of the ultimate parent company's country, is used. We compute tax rate differentials between the host country Germany and the direct owner's home country or the ultimate home country, respectively. The theoretical discussion has shown that the cost of capital is affected by the difference in statutory tax rates if profi ts are shifted. The differences in statutory tax rates constitute the incentive to shift profi ts if affi liates or the parent companies have no current losses and no loss carryforward. Thus, the statutory tax rates are the appropriate tax measures since effects of profi t shifting on investment levels are evaluated. However, as discussed above incentives to shift profi ts change if the affi liate has current losses or a loss carryforward. Therefore, in additional estimations we use an interaction term between the statu- tory tax rate differential and the variable LCF, indicating a loss carryforward at the subsidiary level. Moreover, we use the annual averages of the exchange rate between the ultimate parent company's local currency and the Euro as a control variable. In additional robustness checks, the GDP, the gross fi xed capital formation, and the capital stock of the home country are employed. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the data used by the regressions.
Investigation Approach
The theoretical discussion presented above provides a testable relationship between the investment levels of multinationals in a high-tax host country and the tax rate of another location of the multinational company, which is used as a shelter for profi t shifting. In accordance with the theoretical model, this analysis aims at identifying tax effects due to profi t shifting between a subsidiary in Germany and its direct shareholder company. The focus on this relationship seems to be appropriate because the number of transactions between a subsidiary and its direct owner that can be used to shift profi ts is typically high. It is possible that other affi liates are used to shift profi ts within a multinational group, particularly when taking into account affi liates in tax havens. However, the information on the company structures provided by the MiDi database is very limited. Information is only available on the location of the direct owner and a potential ultimate parent company. Therefore, in additional regressions we will also test whether the tax rate of an ultimate parent company has an additional effect on the investment level of German inbound FDI. Due to this data limitation, we may underestimate the total tax effects of profi t shifting on multinational investments in Germany since profi ts are also shifted toward other affi liated companies. Basically, the firm-level German inbound FDI data, described above, are employed. An advantage for the empirical analysis is the fact that all considered investments are located in a single host country, Germany. Thus, the host country's characteristics only vary over time. Consequently, the host country characteristics such as the local market size, labor costs, and regulations can be controlled by a time-specifi c effect α t . The affi liate-specifi c data on the stock of fi xed assets is used as the dependent variable. Estimation equations of the following type are used: 
where the subscript i denotes the subsidiary, t denotes the year, k denotes the direct owner's home country and l denotes the ultimate owner's home country. 17 The heterogeneity between the subsidiaries is controlled by a subsidiary-specifi c effect α i . Country-specifi c effects α k and α l are introduced in order to control for effects such as distance between Germany and the home country. The tax rate differential between the host country Germany and the direct owner's home country is reflected by STR G,t -STR k,t . The theoretical analysis in the second section suggests that a positive sign can be expected for α 1 due to profi tshifting activities. Note that identifi cation of the tax effect results from variation in STR k,t . Annual changes in STR G,t can also be seen as aggregate shocks because only inbound investments in one country, Germany, are analyzed. Consequently, the time-specifi c effect α t controls for changes in the host-country tax rate.
Moreover, we consider the exchange rate between the ultimate parent company's local currency and the Euro. Several studies fi nd a negative effect of an increasing currency of the host country relative to the currency of the investor's home country on FDI (e.g., Froot and Stein, 1991; Swenson, 1994; Blonigen, 1997) . Froot and Stein (1991) explain this negative effect of an exchange-rate movement on inward FDI by asymmetric information that limits the ability to evaluate managerial ability. Another explanation for the negative effect on FDI is provided by Blonigen (1997) . He refers to the acquisitions of intangible assets that generate earnings in different currencies within a multinational company. In accordance with previous literature we expect a negative effect of the exchange rate.
Finally, the dummy variable LCF, which indicates whether an affi liate has a loss carryforward, is introduced. This dummy variable is used as an indicator for profi tability in previous years. Furthermore, this dummy is an indicator for the possibility of offsetting former losses with current profi ts. Table 4 depicts the basic regression results. The empirical analysis is based on different types of equation [4] . The stock of fi xed assets is used as the dependent variable. According to the theoretical model, column (1) confi rms a positive impact of the tax differential between the host country and the direct owner's home country on the investment level of 17 The direct owner's country differs from the ultimate owner's country if an interposed company is used. subsidiaries in the host country Germany. The point estimator suggests that a one percentage point higher tax rate differential is associated with 0.971 percent additional investments in fi xed assets. This fi rst result supports the view that a lower taxation of shifted profi ts abroad has a positive impact on investment decisions in high-tax Germany.
Regression Results
This proposition is further supported by the specifi cations shown in columns (2) and (3). As discussed in the second section, the incentive to shift profi ts and, thus, the tax sensitivity of investments are expected to be reduced if an affi liate can immediately set off current earnings with losses carried forward. Thus, affi liates exhibiting a loss carryforward may constitute a suitable control group. In columns (2) and (3) asymmetric tax effects of subsidiaries that do or do not have a loss carryforward are estimated. The specifi cation of column (2) demon-strates that loss-carrying subsidiaries are, to some extent, also sensitive to tax rate differentials. However, the semi-elasticity is only 0.682 if a loss carryforward is observed, but the semi-elasticity amounts 1.178 if a subsidiary does not have a loss carryforward. The specifi cation of column (3) confi rms that the difference in the semi-elasticity of about -0.496 is statistically signifi cant. Note that the specifi cations shown in columns (2) and (3) use information about affi liate-specifi c asymmetries in profi t-shifting incentives. Therefore, the signifi cant difference in the tax sensitivity supports the view that the estimated tax effects are due to profi t shifting activities: a higher fi rm-specifi c incentive to shift profi ts is associated with a more pronounced tax effect.
With regard to control variables used in columns (1)-(3), a negative impact of a more expensive Euro on investment levels in Germany is confi rmed. Furthermore, subsidiaries with a loss carryforward show signifi cantly smaller investment levels. The lower investment levels of losscarrying affi liates may be explained by the fact that a loss carryforward refl ects the past business performance of an affi liate. Firms may use this as an indicator for the profi tability of investments in the future. Although the estimated positive effects of the tax rate differential support the proposition that investment levels of foreign subsidiaries are responsive to the taxation of shifted profi ts, one could think about other explanations for this result. 18 The purpose of the following analysis is to discuss other possible explanations for the tax effect. First of all, under a system of worldwide taxation of foreign profi ts, an effect of the tax rate at home might arise due to the taxation of intercompany dividends rather than the taxation of shifted profi ts. However, if the home country's tax rate is smaller than the host country's tax rate, the repatriated dividends are effectively exempt from additional home tax. Therefore, an effect of worldwide tax systems can be neglected here, since the investments are exclusively located in the high-tax host country Germany. During the considered period from 1996 until 2005, the combined tax level consisting of the German company taxation and additional withholding taxes on profi t distribution was typically higher than the taxation in parent companies' home countries that used a worldwide tax system. 19 Additional effects of the home country tax rate on investment in a high-tax host country can arise if there is a relationship between investment at home and FDI. On one hand, FDI might be a substitute for an investment at home. If the parent company has the choice between alternative investment locations, a higher tax rate at home in comparison to the host country tax rate should lead to an increase of investment in the host country. On the other hand, FDI might complement investments at home. 20 If one further considers that a higher tax rate at home may lead to smaller investment levels at home, an increasing tax rate at home would indirectly lead foreign subsidiaries to invest less, e.g., in the host country Germany. While a substitutive relationship should lead to a negative effect of the tax rate differential between Germany and the home country on investment in Germany, the effect will be positive if FDI is a complement of investment at home.
We include several measures for the investment level at home as additional control variables in order to test whether the estimated tax effect is affected by the investment activities at home. Since corresponding fi rm-level data of the parent companies' investment levels are not available, several country-specifi c measures of the investment activity and investment size in the home country are used. 21 The results of these additional specifi cations are presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table  4 . Firstly, we use the home country's GDP in accordance with gravity models explaining trade and FDI. 22 Secondly, we use the gross fi xed capital formation of the home country in a given year. Whereas the GDP may represent a proxy for the market 18 Becker and Riedel (2008) provide a discussion of several channels through which the tax rate of the parent company's location may affect the affi liate's investment level. 19 During the considered period from 1996 until 2005 the German tax rate ranged from 43.9 percent to 39.4 percent.
If additional withholding taxes on profi t distribution between Germany and the US or Japan are considered, the tax level of German inbound investment was higher than tax levels in the US or Japan. These countries had the highest tax rates among the considered countries that used a worldwide tax system. 20 See Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) as well as Desai, Foley and Hines (2005) for empirical evidence. 21 Note that the tax rate used for our empirical analysis is also a country-specifi c rather than a fi rm-specifi c measure. 22 In the context of tax effects on FDI, gravity model specifi cations are employed, e.g., by Mutti and Grubert (2004) .
opportunities at home, gross fi xed capital formation is a sufficient proxy for the investment climate in the investor's home country. Finally, country-specifi c capital stocks of the home country are employed.
The regression results show that the positive effect of the tax differential is robust irrespective of which measure of investment activity at home is used. Thus, these results suggest that the estimated positive impact of the tax rate differential between Germany and the investor's tax rate at home on the investment levels in Germany do not predominantly refl ect an indirect effect that can arise if investment at home and FDI are complements. The negative coeffi cients of the home-country specifi c investment measures estimated in columns (4)-(6) suggest that most of the considered FDI projects in Germany are substitutes rather than complements of investments at home. Table 5 depicts additional results, which are based on subsamples. Firstly, the regressions shown in columns (1)-(4) are based only on the subsidiaries that are not held by an interposed company located in a country other than the parent company. These results are very similar to the basic results shown in Table 4 . Secondly, the specifi cations shown in columns (5)-(9) of Table 5 are based on subsidiaries that are held by an interposed entity. An example is a subsidiary in Germany, which is ultimately held by a US corporation but directly controlled by an interposed company in the Netherlands. Just like in the basic regressions, the variable STR is the tax rate of the direct owner, here the tax rate of the holding company in the Netherlands. The point estimators of the tax effects depicted in column (5) suggest more pronounced tax effects. However, a formal test, which is not reported here, reveals that the tax effects are not statistically different if a subsidiary is held by an interposed entity. Furthermore, this subsample can be used to test whether characteristics of the ultimate parent's home country may have additional effects on the results. First of all, a possible additional effect of the tax rate differential between Germany and the ultimate parent company's country, STR G -STR ult , is tested in column (6). However, the additional tax effects are statistically insignifi cant. Columns (7)-(9) indicate that this result also holds true when measures of the investment climate of the ultimate parent's country are included. The results suggest that profi tshifting activities and related investment effects seem to be particularly important between a subsidiary and its direct owner.
At fi rst glance, our results confl ict with previous studies, which consider the investor's home-country tax rate. They fi nd positive or insignifi cant effects of the home-country tax rate on FDI (Slemrod, 1990; Cassou, 1997; Egger, Loretz, Pfaffermayr, and Winner, 2006; Wijeweera, Dollery, and Clark, 2007) . Unlike these studies, our data consists of real investment levels of affi liates for which location decisions in favor of one specifi c country have already been made. Thus, our empirical analysis is more exclusively focused on the investment-size effects due to profi t-shifting activities, while previous studies based on aggregated data are likely to estimate total tax effects due to several underlying mechanisms. Our results are recently confi rmed by Becker and Riedel (2008) by means of a data set of affi liates located in several European low-and high-tax countries. While these results were based on data of investors from countries with both smaller and higher tax rates than the host country's tax level, our analysis is exclusively based on investment data of foreign affi liates located in one specifi c high-tax host country, namely Germany. In the case of a very high tax level in a host country, profi t shifting becomes more important. In accordance with the tax effect of profi t shifting, our empirical analysis identifi es a positive impact of the tax rate differential between the host and the home country on real investments. Moreover, we fi nd Note: Dependent variable is (ln) Fixed Assets. Columns (1)-(4) are based on all directly held subsidiaries. Columns (5)-(9) consider affi liates held via a conduit entity. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered within year-country cells and robust against random fi rm-specifi c and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula.
*, **, and *** denote signifi cance at the ten percent, fi ve percent, and one percent level. All estimates include a full set of fi rm, time, and direct owner's home country fi xed effects. In columns (5)-(9) country fi xed effects are restricted to the country of the interposed entity due to a lack of degrees of freedom. more pronounced effects of the tax rate differential if subsidiaries have a stronger incentive to shift profi ts because they do not have a loss carryforward. Additional robustness checks suggest that the estimated tax effects are unaffected by the investment activities in the parent companies' home countries.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical analysis shows that the tax level of another entity becomes important for the investment decisions in a high-tax host country if this entity is used to shift profi ts. In this case the investment level in the high-tax host country should increase with a rising tax rate differential between the host country and the other location, which is used as a tax shelter. This proposition is confi rmed by our empirical analysis. By using fi rmlevel data of German inbound investments, we fi nd a signifi cantly positive effect of the tax rate differential between Germany and the direct owner's home country on the investment level in the host country Germany. Since repatriated profi ts from Germany were effectively tax exempt-due to the very high German tax level-our results suggest that investment decisions are signifi cantly affected by the taxation of shifted profi t.
We can conclude that multinationals gain signifi cant competitive advantages by means of shifting profi ts if the parent company is located in a lower taxing home country. Furthermore, our analysis shows that advantages are also evident if an interposed company in a lower taxing country is used. It can be assumed that similar advantages may be generated by using other affi liated companies to shift profi ts. Thus, we may underestimate the total effect of profi t-shifting activities on real investment decisions. However, the estimated magnitudes suggest that effects due to taxation of shifted profi ts on investments in a high-tax host country play an important role. The competitive advantage due to enhanced tax planning opportunities of multinational companies may affect the competition with purely national companies. Since our data set is restricted to affi liates of multinational companies, this must remain a topic for further research.
The results lead to interesting implications for tax policy and its effects on multinationals' investment decisions. Tax rate cuts in a country need not necessarily induce negative effects on multinationals' investment activities in other countries. In particular, a positive effect on FDI in high-tax countries can be expected to a certain extent if signifi cant profi t-shifting activities exist between the tax-cutting country and other high-tax countries such as Germany or the US. Furthermore, from a high-tax country's point of view, the negative effect of the own tax rate is mitigated by profi t-shifting activities of multinational companies. Against this background, anti-avoidance legislation set up to restrict profi t-shifting opportunities and to protect tax revenues may constitute signifi cant negative investment effects.
